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1 
IN RE TAM: TREATING TRADEMARKS AS EXPRESSIVE 
SPEECH 
Simon Shiao Tam first sought to register the name of his band, The 
Slants, as a trademark in 2011.
1
 At the time, Mr. Tam was seeking to use 
his band’s name to reclaim negative Asian stereotypes.
2
 However, the 
trademark examiner found that even though Mr. Tam was seeking to 
reappropriate the term, a substantial composite of people of Asian de-
scent would find the stereotype offensive.
3
 So, the examiner refused to 
register the mark under the disparagement provision of section 2(a) of 
the Lanham Act.
4
 Mr. Tam appealed the examiner’s decision to the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), which upheld the examin-
er’s refusal to register the mark.
5
 Mr. Tam again appealed to the Federal 
Circuit, which initially upheld the examiner’s decision and held that 
precedent foreclosed Tam’s argument that section 2(a) is unconstitution-
al.
6
 After that decision, the Federal Circuit sua sponte ordered a rehearing 
en banc on the question of the constitutionality of section 2(a).
7
 
The disparagement provision of section 2(a) specifies that a trade-
mark may not be registered on the principal register if it “consists of or 
comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which 
may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons living or 
dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into con-
tempt or disrepute.”
8
 Until Tam, the Federal Circuit relied on In re 
McGinley to assert the constitutionality of section 2(a).
9
 The court in 
McGinley held that because a refusal to register a trademark does not 
mean that the trademark cannot be used, section 2(a) does not violate the 
First Amendment.
10
 Courts and the TTAB, supported by the decision in 
McGinley upholding the section’s constitutionality, have rejected a varie-
ty of trademarks under section 2(a)’s disparagement provision, including: 
“Redskins”; “Stop the Islamisation of America”; “The Christian Prosti-
tute”; and “Mormon Whiskey.”
11
 
The majority in this case held that it would be unconstitutional for 
the government to refuse to register trademarks under the disparagement 
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provision of section 2(a) of the Lanham Act.
12
 The Court used strict scru-
tiny to evaluate section 2(a) because it viewed section 2(a) as a govern-
mental regulation burdening private speech based on disapproval of the 
message conveyed.
13
 The Court rejected the government’s argument that 
strict scrutiny should not apply because the speech regulated is commer-
cial speech by noting that it is the expressive aspects of the trademarks 
that are regulated under 2(a), not the trademarks’ ability to act as source 
identifiers.
14
 The majority also dismissed the argument that the re-
strictions of section 2(a) are viewpoint neutral, citing examples of the 
same word being allowed in some trademarks while other trademarks 
using the same word were barred from registration by section 2(a).
15
 Ad-
ditionally, the Court emphasized that it does not matter whether the 
speech is actually banned by noting that section 2(a) burdens speech by 
denying trademark holders the significant benefits of a federal registra-
tion.
16
 After concluding that section 2(a) should be subject to strict scru-
tiny, the Court analyzed the provision under intermediate scrutiny to 
show that section 2(a) would still be unconstitutional if it were regulating 
commercial speech.
17
 Ultimately, the Court found that the government’s 
only interest was in burdening speech that the government finds offen-
sive.
18
 Consequentially, the Court held that the government had no legit-
imate interest to justify section 2(a), meaning that the provision is uncon-
stitutional under the First Amendment.
19
 
The concurring opinion, written by Judge O’Malley, argued that 
section 2(a) is also unconstitutionally vague.
20
 The concurring opinion 
also drove home the point that section 2(a) is often applied inconsistent-
ly, making it difficult for a trademark holder to know whether the provi-
sion will be used against a certain trademark.
21
 The dissenting opinion, 
written by Judge Dyk also argued that section 2(a) is unconstitutional in 
Mr. Tam’s case.
22
 However, the dissent argued that the majority should 
not have held that the statute is facially unconstitutional as applied to 
commercial speech.
23
 Two dissenting opinions, written by Judge Lourie 
and Judge Reyna, argued that section 2(a) is constitutional and that the 
TTAB decision should be upheld.
24
 Judge Lourie argued that stare deci-
sis should be respected and the fact that section 2(a) is constitutional is 
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settled law.
25
 Judge Reyna argued that Mr. Tam’s speech is commercial, 




Without the Tam decision, the goals of trademark law are not met 
for a small subset of trademarks—those deemed to be disparaging. At 
one point, the Court outlined the two goals of trademark law, which are, 
generally, to serve as source identifier so that the public knows the goods 
it is getting are what it wanted and to protect trademark holders from 
others using their trademarks.
27
 One of the major benefits of federal reg-
istration is exclusive nationwide use of a trademark where there is no 
prior use of the mark by anyone else.
28
 Without federal registration, an-
other band could call itself The Slants and perform in an area where Mr. 
Tam’s band had not performed. If that happened, both goals of trademark 
law would not be met. Because the band had the same name, consumers 
could buy tickets to the performance, wrongfully assuming that they had 
purchased tickets to see Mr. Tam’s band. Additionally, the band would 
be able to use the trademark and would gain priority over Mr. Tam for 
use of the name in that particular geographical area. That outcome is now 
prevented, assuming that the TTAB does not find other grounds for re-
fusing Mr. Tam’s registration.  
The Court’s decision in Tam also serves important social goals. So-
cial scientists have noted that many disparaging words are now being 
“reclaimed” by the populations those words were once used against.
29
 A 
2003 study noted that reclaiming words or negative stereotypes can help 
both stigmatized groups and individuals to fight stereotypes and preju-
dice.
30
 This type of reappropriation is what Mr. Tam was attempting by 
naming his band The Slants.
31
 In the original TTAB proceeding, the 
board said that because a substantial subset of persons of Asian descent 
would find the term offensive, it was irrelevant that Mr. Tam was at-
tempting to reappropriate the word.
32
 However, with language quickly 
changing and a standard as shaky as a substantial subset of affected per-
sons, the PTO may end up hurting the progression of minority and stig-
matized groups by burdening their attempts to reclaim disparaging words 
and to fight prejudice.  
The Tam decision is also important to artistic entities. Artistic enti-
ties, like bands, use trademark law in the same way as commercial enti-
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ties, but convey different messages through their trademarks. The court 
rightly dismissed the argument that trademarks are purely commercial 
speech. While many trademarks employed by traditional corporate enti-
ties are not expressive, artistic entities, such as The Slants, can benefit 
from trademark protection and choose trademarks for expressive reasons. 
Having a murky provision such as section 2(a)’s disparagement provi-
sion burdening the speech of artistic entities is clearly unconstitutional 
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